Ready Or Not, We Fight

Europe may not be optimally ready to defend itself without America, but what if it has to?

Conclusive evidence of American ill will towards Europe has mounted to the extent that Europeans now agree that the continent has to be ready to defend itself on its own. Any American contribution, especially in the nuclear realm, is an added bonus - not plan A.

From a Russian perspective, it is not necessarily rational to wait five years until Europe has rearmed and figured out command and control without the US. Therefore, Europe needs to learn that perfect is the enemy of good enough, and adopt a ‘can do’ mindset even if circumstances are suboptimal.

The Nordic region is reasonably well off when it comes to military capability, but what the Nordic countries mainly lack is manpower. Finland is the only country in Northern Europe with a real force generation ability, with a reserve of up to 870,000 and crossing 1 million by 2031, with the reserve age limit raised to 65 for tasks in the rear. The other Nordic countries are well below 100,000 in terms of mobilization potential. In the wider Nordic-Baltic region, Estonia is another outlier with its total mobilization potential, like in Finland, reaching almost 20 percent of the population, totalling up to 230,000.

The human resources issue is not one that can be solved quickly. Although all the Nordic and Baltic countries have reinstated conscription in some form by now, increasing troop numbers is a slow business, when starting from a low initial number. For example Sweden that brought back a selective, gender-neutral conscription back in 2017 now has the capacity to train about 8000 conscripts per year – compared with 22,000 in Finland, where conscription was not paused after the Cold War. For comparison, Germany is aiming to reach a total troop strength (including reserve) of 460,000 – by 2033.

However, the Nordic countries have managed to compensate for the relatively low numbers in personnel by increasing and intensifying their cooperation. Especially in the Cap of the North region that encompasses the northernmost parts of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, the defence forces of the three countries are becoming increasingly well integrated. Finland and Sweden’s NATO accession unlocked new possibilities in regional military integration, so joining the alliance was not in vain from a Finnish and Swedish perspective, even though the alliance finds itself in an unprecedented crisis with no clear future.

Staff from the Nordic Division at JAOC Bodø. Picture: Petra Blomqvist/ Swedish Defence Forces

In the Nordic region, the air forces have been drivers of integration, with a joint Nordic Air Power Concept for better interoperability and a Nordic division established in 2025 at the Norwegian Joint Air Operation Centre (JAOC) in Bodø. The new NATO Forward Land Force in Finland, with Sweden as a framework nation and contributions from the other Nordic countries, the UK, France, and Italy, is facilitating increased exercise activity and regional land force integration. In the maritime domain, the closest cooperation is between Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea, including transferring units under each other’s command. Norway, in turn, has been building strategic partnerships with Germany through a joint submarine project and other strategic areas, and with the UK through joint procurement of a frigate.

Nordic-Baltic cooperation is another area that has seen significant steps forward since 2022. Politically, the “NB8” format has become a prominent voice in European debates about the continent’s security and defence, and overall future outlook. The Nordic-Baltic countries, despite their small size, have also been leading the European efforts to support Ukraine militarily. Demark, Sweden, and Norway are among Ukraine’s strongest supporters not only as share of GDP, but in absolute terms, putting many larger countries’ comparably inadequate contributions to shame. In military terms, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) that includes the Nordic and Baltic countries and the Netherlands, is an important coalition of like-minded and interoperable countries in the region.

The ongoing US withdrawal from Europe, and especially expressions of hostile intentions by the current administration towards NATO allies, pose a significant dilemma for the defence of Northern Europe. The Nordic countries have hitherto prepared to hold the line until allied (i.e. American) reinforcements arrive. But now it looks increasingly evident that Europeans are on their own and no such reinforcements will arrive from North America, apart from whatever Canada can contribute. That radically changes the way defence in a possible conflict with Russia is planned, especially in the Arctic and North Atlantic.

When thinking about possible conflict trajectories in Northern Europe, the mobilizable strength of the Finnish land force and the combined numbers of the Nordic air forces (a joint fleet of about 250 4+/5^th generation fighter jets), that are all also investing in long-range capabilities with significant conventional deterrent effect, may dissuade Russia from any large-scale ground invasion either in Finland, Northern Norway, or the Baltic states. However, the maritime areas in the High North, as well as the North Atlantic are of high strategic priority to Russia. The wider Nordic region, far beyond the analytically not very up-to-date Narva scenarios, is therefore exposed to Russian power projection interests in terms of its access to the Atlantic Ocean from the High North. However, while the main goal for Northern European allies used to be to keep an eye on Russian submarine movements and prevent them from accessing the Atlantic beyond the so-called Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap, to guarantee safe passage for reinforcements and supplies from the US and to stop Russian submarines from threatening US east coast, this is now a lower priority than the more acute defence of the Scandinavian peninsula and Finland.

But the US itself poses and even bigger dilemma. No NATO members are geared to fight the US, should it act on its threats against allied territory either in Greenland or Canada – on the contrary, maximal interoperability with US forces has been the goal for NATO countries for decades. That Denmark nevertheless demonstrated readiness to fight US forces, should they move on Greenland, was a powerful signal of willingness to defend, no matter who the adversary is, also to the Kremlin.

The Greenland crisis marked a point of no return for the Nordic countries, as Denmark has been one of the most loyal US allies. The Iran war and the US administration’s display of strategic shortsightedness, combined with tantrums about allied lack of enthusiasm is further adding to the strain. The war itself is just the lesson in geography for the current US administration that Trump and his team urgently needed. The European arguments about their crucial role and contributions to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) were lost on this administration until now, as Trump, Vance & Co. thought that the GWOT was a mistake to begin with. Now, they have gained first-hand experience in conducting military operations in the Middle East. And it turns out that doing so without access to bases in Europe is difficult, no matter who sits in the White House. However, this administration is unlikely to learn from its mistakes and change course on relations with Europe.

Beyond NATO’s function as a vehicle of US security guarantees to Europe, the alliance also provides a structure for military cooperation between European countries. NATO is therefore unlikely to collapse as an organisation even if the US entirely loses interest, as European members have an incentive to retain it in place – although in a radically different form. The current work to define and build “a European pillar” and the ongoing burden shifting are preparations for this eventuality. The challenge in Europe will be, then, to ensure that the various regional coalitions coordinate and cooperate with each other.