Narva Is Actually Alright

Forget the idea of Russian little green men storming the Estonian border town Narva and thereby ending NATO.

First, a quick announcement that Anastasiia Lapatina, Fabian Hoffmann, Karen-Anna Eggen and I have started a podcast on European security: the Mildly Alarmed ! In the first episode, we discuss the current state of the war in Ukraine. You can listen to it on YouTube, Spotify, or Apple Podcasts. The first three episodes will be an intoductory series, with an episode on European security next week and the third one on global issues the week after.

Narva Is Actually Alright

This post was written in cooperation with Marek Kohv, Head of the Security & Resilience Programme at ICDS Tallinn.

The idea that the small Estonian border town Narva, with some 50,000 inhabitants, will be next on the Russian menu has become such a popular headline that the “Narva scenario” even has its own Wikipedia page. But contrary to popular belief, Narva is not simply up for grabs.

First, despite a 85 percent Russian-speaking population, Narvans are not loyal to Putin. Ukraine has shown that the language question is not as clear-cut as the Kremlin would like outsiders to believe, and Narva is no exception.

Generally, willingness to defend the country is extremely high in Estonia: in a 2025 survey, 82 percent of residents believed Estonia must resist militarily if attacked, including 89 percent of ethnic Estonians and 70 percent of other nationalities (mainly Russians). Furthermore, 85 percent of Estonians and 78 percent of residents of other nationalities consider belonging to Estonian society important to them, and 77 percent of the Estonian population are proud of living in Estonia. In Northeastern Estonia, with a large population share of Russian ethnicity, the number of those who feel proud is 65 percent.

Second, if you have an obvious hotspot in your country that Russia has tried to exploit previously, you also have multiple contingency plans. Unlike many Western European countries that largely stopped national defence planning after the Cold War, Estonia has a plan.

After a series of early warning experiences in the 2000s, Estonia adapted its approach to national security. The Russian hybrid campaign in 2007 combining all instruments of power (diplomatic and economic pressure, cyber offensive and propaganda campaign, rioting and active measures of Russian special services), and Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008 exposed new forms of hybrid conflict and accelerated strategic reform. In response, Estonia adopted a new national defence concept in 2010 that expanded the concept of security beyond purely military defence. It defined national defence as a responsibility shared across all state institutions, supported by civil society, international cooperation, and psychological defence.

As a result of two decades of work, Estonia’s security architecture is now built on a layered and integrated approach that combines national defence readiness, allied cooperation, and clear intelligence picture. Rather than relying on a single pillar, Estonia has developed a system in which military capability, civilian resilience, and international partnerships reinforce one another.

Public attitudes strongly support this model. Trust in the Estonian Defence Forces (EDF) remains high, and 62 percent of the population would personally contribute to national defence according to their abilities.

Narva Castle. Photo: KalervoK (Wikimedia Commons)

Third, the various Narva scenarios usually assume that Russia would manage to surprise Estonia. However, that is very unlikely. The Estonian intelligence services are laser-focused on Russia. A “little green men” scenario à la Crimea would not work a second time, because countries in Russia’s vicinity are monitoring any developments hinting at a similar attempt closely.

Intelligence plays a central role in the Estonian national defence framework, enabling early warning and improved situational awareness, particularly in response to hybrid threats. The Estonian Internal Security Service (KAPO) has a good overview of attempts by Russian special services to carry out influence activities in Estonia, create intelligence networks or divide society. KAPO has repeatedly and successfully exposed and neutralized such attempts.

The Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service and the Military Intelligence Centre constantly monitor military and political developments in Russia. A former chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) stated in 2022 that “pound-for-pound they probably knock us into a cocked hat” regarding Estonian intelligence expertise on Russia. “No one else is spying for us here - we are Estonian state intelligence and we also see ourselves as NATO intelligence. This is our sector here, we are responsible for this information gathering, so to speak,” said the Director of Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service Kaupo Rosin.

Fourth, any limited Russian attack on one of the Baltic states will not be the end of NATO, because the Baltic states can deal with a limited number of Russians even without allied help. While most Western European countries paused or entirely abolished military service and therefore lost their force generation ability, Estonia has a mobilisation register of around 230,000 individuals and can rapidly expand its wartime structure to more than 43,000 positions – trained together and equipped as units.

This capacity is sustained through compulsory conscription, continuous reservist training, and regular snap reserve exercises introduced in 2016 to test mobilisation readiness without prior notice. Annually, reserve units of up to 20 000 personnel are called up for exercises. From 2027, the EDF will transition to a training cycle focused on the concept of combat readiness as a practical part of conscript service designed to enhance the military’s ability to respond at short notice to a wide range of threats across land, sea, air, cyber, and cognitive domains. Its goal is to ensure unit- and domain-specific readiness to react to emerging security challenges throughout the year.

The voluntary Defence League complements the regular forces by embedding national defence across society. Its nationwide presence ensures territorial coverage, providing continuous local security and support functions. Given that the Defence League maintains a daily presence throughout Estonia, it also means 24/7 protection for more remote areas – including Narva. Together, these institutions reflect Estonia’s principle of whole-of-society defence, where national security is not limited to the armed forces but involves civilian institutions, volunteers, and critical infrastructure providers.

Furthermore, the EDF are establishing a military complex in Narva that can accommodate up to 1,000 service members. The recently opened operational headquarters of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) in Narva-Jõesuu is an additional contribution on the eastern border. The centre coordinates border guard operations in the Nordic and Baltic countries, bringing international expertise and additional personnel to the region. Joint operations and coordination structures support border management, crisis response, and monitoring of irregular migration and cross-border threats. Narva won’t be a walk in the park for little green men.